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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
CHRISTOPHER WAYNE THOMPSON, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 43714
KOOTENAI COUNTY
NO. CR 2013-20004
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Christopher Wayne Thompson pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder. The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifty-two-years,
with sixteen years fixed. Mr. Thompson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”)
motion, which the district court denied. Mr. Thompson appealed, asserting the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court’s order denying
Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion should be affirmed, because the district court lost
jurisdiction to grant the Rule 35 motion, and because Mr. Thompson did not present any
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new evidence in support of the Rule 35 motion. (Resp. Br., pp.2-5.) This Reply Brief is
necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Thompson’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Thompson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Thompson’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence
Mr. Thompson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. Mr. Thompson asserts
his sentence is excessive in view of the new and additional information presented with
the Rule 35 motion.

Specifically, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional

information on his mental health issues and the treatment he was undergoing
while incarcerated.
A.

The District Court Acted Within A Reasonable Time In Ruling On The
Rule 35 Motion
The State argues Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion was not timely ruled upon,

and, due to the passage of time, the district court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion.

2

(Resp. Br., pp.2-4.) However, the district court here acted within a reasonable time in
ruling on the Rule 35 motion and therefore had jurisdiction.
Under Rule 35, a district court “may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the
filing of a judgment of conviction,” and “may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of
probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order
revoking probation.” I.C.R. 35(b). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held “a
district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion under Rule 35 merely
because the 120-day period expires before the judge reasonably can consider and act
upon the motion.” State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, “if the trial court does not rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a
reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.” Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “[t]he reasonableness of any delay by the
district court in ruling upon a Rule 35 motion must be evaluated in light of the purposes
supporting the 120-day limitation and reasons for the trial court’s delay in each case.”
State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2001). The Court of Appeals has also
held that “when a defendant files a Rule 35 motion, it will of necessity become defense
counsel’s responsibility to precipitate action on the motion within a reasonable time
frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for delay, to avoid the
risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the motion.” State v. Day, 131 Idaho
184, 186 (Ct. App. 1998).
Here, the State acknowledges Mr. Thompson filed a timely Rule 35 motion on
May 26, 2015, sixty-three days after the entry of judgment on March 24, 2015. (Resp.

3

Br., p.1 (citing R., pp.255-59).) The district court initially scheduled a hearing on the
Rule 35 motion for July 10, 2015, before continuing the hearing to July 17, again to
August 21, and ultimately to October 2, 2015. (See R., p.10.) As the State suggests
(Resp. Br., p.3), the register of actions indicates those continuances were upon defense
counsel’s request. (See R., p.10.) The district court took the matter under advisement
following the hearing (Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.36, L.23 – p.37, L.4), and then issued its
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion on October 27,
2015. (R., pp.268-76.) As the State has noted (Resp. Br., p.3), the district court denied
the Rule 35 motion approximately 217 days after judgment or 154 days after the
Rule 35 motion was filed.
The State argues “[t]he record contains no explanation for the multiple
continuances of the hearing on the motion, and nothing in the record justifies such a
lengthy delay.”

(Resp. Br., pp.3-4.) However, it could be said that the delay was

caused in part by the retirement of the original sentencing judge.

The original

sentencing judge retired in between the issuance of the judgment and the filing of the
Rule 35 motion, on May 1, 2015. (See Office of the Governor, Governor Appoints
Coeur d’Alene Trial Court Attorney to First Judicial District Bench (May 1, 2015),
available at https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2015/2%20Feb/pr_25.html.) The
State and the district court recognized that the district court was reviewing the
discretionary decision of the original sentencing judge. (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.34,
Ls.15-17; R., pp.274-75.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a district court did not lose jurisdiction
to act upon a timely Rule 35 motion after the expiration of the 120-day period, where
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“the delay was caused in part by the retirement of the original sentencing judge.”
State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Simpson, 131
Idaho 196, 198 (Ct. App. 1998) (indicating that a delay might be reasonable in a
situation where the district judge who was sitting at the time the defendant filed a Rule
35 motion was succeeded in office by a different judge and the latter ruled on the
motion). Like the original sentencing judge in Torres, the original sentencing judge in
this case retired, which could account for part of the district court’s delay in ruling on
Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion. If so, the Court should not “visit the consequences of
such delay upon [Mr. Thompson].” See Torres, 107 Idaho at 898.
A comparison with the circumstances in Simpson may also help show why the
district court did not lose jurisdiction to rule on Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion. In
Simpson, the district court imposed sentence in June 1995, the defendant filed a Rule
35 motion in August 1995, and the district court denied the motion after a hearing in
January 1997. Simpson, 131 Idaho at 197. The Court of Appeals observed that, while
“the record is silent as to the basis for the district court’s delay in deciding” the
defendant’s Rule 35 motion, it appeared “that the district judge who was sitting at the
time [the defendant] filed his motion was succeeded in office by a different judge and
that it was the latter who eventually ruled on [the defendant’s motion.” Id. at 198.
Citing Torres, 107 Idaho at 898, the Simpson Court stated, “[u]nder different
circumstances, this explanation might be sufficient for this Court to consider the sixteenmonth delay to be reasonable.” Simpson, 131 Idaho at 198. But the Court then noted
the defendant “had almost completely served the fixed portion of his sentence and
would soon be parole-eligible at the time the district court ruled on the motion.” Id.
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Under those circumstances, the Simpson Court held the district court lost jurisdiction to
act upon the Rule 35 motion because “the court’s assertion of jurisdiction would infringe
upon the authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole.” Id.
In contrast to the defendant in Simpson, Mr. Thompson was not close to
completely serving the sixteen-year fixed portion of his sentence at the time the district
court ruled on his Rule 35 motion. (See R., pp.256, 275.) Further, the total period of
delay between the filing of the Rule 35 motion and the issuance of the district court’s
order was only 154 days or about five months in this case (See R., pp.258, 268), as
opposed to the corresponding sixteen-month period of delay in Simpson. See Simpson,
131 Idaho at 198.
Thus, in light of Torres and Simpson, where the Idaho Court of Appeals
recognized delay in ruling upon a timely Rule 35 motion caused by the retirement of the
original sentencing judge may be reasonable, the district court here acted within a
reasonable time in ruling on Mr. Thompson’s Rule 35 motion and therefore
had jurisdiction. The State’s argument on this issue is unavailing.
B.

Mr. Thompson Presented New And Additional Information In Support Of The
Rule 35 Motion
The State argues that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to rule upon the

Rule 35 motion, Mr. Thompson did not establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying the motion because he presented no new evidence in support.
(Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)

The State contends that information on Mr. Thompson’s

“stabilization on psychotropic medications, participation in mental health treatment and
counseling while incarcerated, and lack of disciplinary problems while incarcerated was
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before the district court at the time of sentencing,” and that he “has continued to be
stable on his psychotropic medications, participate in mental health treatment and
counsel, and not have disciplinary problems is not ‘new’ information.” (Resp. Br., p.5.)
However, Mr. Thompson actually presented new and additional information in support of
the Rule 35 motion.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion,
the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new information.” Id.
In this case, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional information in support
of his Rule 35 motion regarding his mental health issues and the treatment he was
undergoing while incarcerated in prison. (See Tr., Oct. 2, 2015, p.7, L.22 – p.11, L.25.)
The information cited by the State that was available at the time of sentencing instead
pertained to Mr. Thompson’s pre-judgment mental health issues and treatment while in
jail.

(See, e.g., Tr., Mar. 23, 2015, p.78, Ls.12-17 (“Dr. Carlberg, a dedicated

psychiatrist, was willing to come and spend hours and hours a week in the jail and work
on the different medications and work with me until we got [Mr. Thompson] to where he
was stable.”).) The State has not presented any authority for its apparent argument that
information is not “new” if it deals with the same factors that were before the district
court at sentencing.
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Further, the district court, in its order denying the Rule 35 motion, stated
“Defendant’s rehabilitation during the short time he has been incarcerated is noted.”
(R., pp.274-75.) Contrary to the State’s contention, the district court characterized that
information as “new evidence.” (See R., p.275.) Also, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
consistently held that evidence of a defendant’s “good conduct while in prison is worthy
of consideration.” See, e.g., State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 176 (Ct. App. 2004) (“This
Court has held that although good conduct while in prison is worthy of consideration, it
may not necessarily result in a reduction of a prisoner’s sentence.”); State v. Sanchez,
117 Idaho 51, 52 (Ct. App. 1990) (“Sanchez also invites our attention to evidence
presented in support of her Rule 35 motion, that she has exhibited good conduct while
in prison. Evidence of this kind is worthy of consideration; but as every judge knows, it
may not be an accurate indicator of future conduct in a noncustodial setting.”)
Thus, Mr. Thompson presented new and additional information on his mental
health issues and the treatment he was undergoing while incarcerated. The State’s
argument on this point is contrary to the district court’s own determination and Idaho
Court of Appeals precedent, and should be rejected as unavailing.
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., pp.5-7), in view of the new and
additional information on his mental health issues and the treatment he was undergoing
while incarcerated, Mr. Thompson asserts his sentence is excessive. Thus,
Mr. Thompson submits that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Thompson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CHRISTOPHER WAYNE THOMPSON
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JOHN M ADAMS
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